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ABSTRACT 
    Weather is becoming more and more unpredictable for farmers, and the frequency of 
extreme weather events is also increasing. Small households in Kenya are vulnerable to these 
extreme weather shocks, and failures in effective hedging will make sustainable production 
extremely difficult for them. The goal of this thesis is to use historical rainfall record in Kenya to 
forecast rainfall and take quantile of the rainfall distribution to get a trigger for a put-option 
embedded innovative financial instrument. There are two methods to develop this lower 20% 
band trigger, which are pert distribution and time series method. Finally, I get two sets of results 
from two methods. With the help of the simulation results, insurance companies will be able to 
design a weather-index insurance for small households in Kenya. For farmers, they will use this 
flexible insurance as an effective substitute for traditional deposit, which requires productive 
assets as collaterals.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The most significant risk to farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa is the failure of periodic 
rains. Periodic rains are rainfalls happening between October and January, known as 
“long rains”, and between March and May, known as “short rains”. When either season 
of periodic rain fails, farmers face substantial hardship from the loss of their crops. 
These crop failures lead to loss of livelihoods, reduced expenditures on food and 
education, and the sale of productive assets, which leads farmers into a poverty trap that 
is difficult to escape without external help (Makaudze, E. 2012; Kumar, Turvey, and 
Kropp, 2013). This thesis explores insurance solutions to compensate farmers for losses 
during adverse weather events, and a credit pricing issue that is related to a pilot program 
for risk contingent credit in Kenya.  
A study conducted by Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) reports that farmers 
in Sub-Saharan Africa have recently experienced more unpredictable weather patterns 
than they have in the past (Makaudze, E. 2012). The frequency of extreme weather 
events, especially droughts in Africa, is increasing significantly, and farmers, especially 
small households, are becoming more vulnerable to unpredictable weather patterns. 
Given such uncertainty about weather conditions, farmers would benefit greatly from 
an innovative financial instrument to help them hedge against losses from adverse 
weather events. However, farmers face a market failure in this regard; they lack any sort 
of insurance that would protect them against losses from losing their crops. Further, 
financial institutions are unwilling to provide credit to small household farmers, due to 
their high default rates. In the absence of affordable credit, farmers don’t have enough 
capital to purchase inputs, expand capacity, or to implement new technology. 
Smallholder farmers need flexible and accessible credit solutions, which can 
help them hedge volatility in production caused by unpredictable weather shocks. Risk 
contingent-credit (RCC) is one of the instruments designed to properly guide 
agricultural production (Shee, Turvey, Woodard, 2015; Shee, Turvey 2012). A pilot 
program based on RCC is currently underway in Kenya. The pilot program of RCC is 
in Machakos County, which is a maize growing area, with some intercropping with 
perennial fruits or other cash crops (Shee, Turvey, You, 2015). Most farmers in this area 
are small households who are vulnerable to extreme weather event. There are two major 
rainfall seasons, which are long rain season and short rain season. Those two rainfall 
seasons contribute to the major rainfall of the area. This RCC pilot program want to set 
a dynamic mechanism in credit, which connects loan repayment to the performance of 
underlying asset, which is rainfall here to prevent farmers from droughts. Finally, 
farmers can maintain a stable cash flow either during the good rainfall season and 
drought.  
In some other countries, such as Mexico, weather index insurance was approved 
by the government and emerged out of a similar pilot program (Yucemen, 2005) applied 
the mechanism as RCC pilot program in Kenya. However, in Africa, the application of 
this insurance is still at its initial stage. Some other RCC-related practices pay attention 
to spatial characteristics, such as temperature and precipitation, to construct models for 
RCC. For example, a cooling degree day (CDD) index is used as a benchmark to 
quantify spatial risks brought by weather (Norton, Turvey, Osgood, 2012). In the case 
of Kenya, rainfall will be the weather event of most importance. Nowadays, institutions 
ranging from local governments to international organizations are paying attention to 
the initiation of this innovative financial instrument. Of course, there is an enormous 
potential demand among farmers, especially those poor small household farmers 
trapped in poverty.  
As local insurers lack experience with weather-index insurance policies, the 
pricing process needs to be better understood before the market for such weather-index 
insurance ultimately attains the desired breadth and depth. In addition, local 
governments don’t have relevant experience, and they will also need more information 
to be able to customize the policies and regulations related to weather-index insurance.   
In the Kenya pilot project, rainfall triggers were based on Monte Carlo 
Simulation of cumulative rainfall, which follows an empirical PERT distribution. To 
advance principal of efficiency and equity in RCC design, it is important to consider 
alternative risk metrics. This thesis tries to use an alternative time series methods to 
model rainfall patterns in Kenya.  
 
1.2 Economic Problem  
The economic problem investigated throughout this thesis is market failure in 
the insurance and credit markets in Kenya. In the absence of a marketable collateral, 
insurance can provide an effective substitute for collateral (Shee, Turvey, 2012). With 
the existence of insurance, small famers could theoretically access credit, while 
retaining valuable productive collateral. The preservation of collateral could solve 
credit-rationing problems, and farmers would be more willing to use credit, while 
lowering risk in production and improving their quality of life. In contrast to the current 
situation in Kenya where small farmers must seek external support to hedge themselves 
from weather shocks, RCC can provide farmers with a comparatively inexpensive way 
to protect their productive assets, either partially or fully. 
If rainfall patterns can’t be captured accurately and covariate risks can’t solved 
smoothly, it will be difficult to lend money to local farmers from a risk management 
perspective. Incorporating insurance into a credit product will make lending more 
accessible by lowering covariate risks. Finally, lending to small households in Kenya 
will be better positioned, and credit supply in agriculture will be increased accordingly.  
 
1.2.1 Background  
 The problem of credit in developing countries impedes agricultural productivity 
and therefore causes poverty trap potentially. Uncertainties in weather and poor local 
infrastructure construction affect credit use, and marketing opportunities in agriculture. 
Those adverse situations force farmers to use low-risk and low-return activities during 
the production, and finally make poverty a wide-spread and persistent problem in 
developing countries (Shee, Turvey, Woodard, 2015). 
 Credit constraint is a significant issue, which prevents farmer from escaping 
poverty. Credit-constrained households refer to conditions: 1. Farmers won’t enter into 
credit market, because they may assume that they will be denied credit; 2. After applying 
the loan, farmers are refused. 3. Farmers receive less amount of loan than their 
previously requested amount. Credit-constraints are significant problems in developing 
countries, affecting the efficiency of farmers’ production in agriculture. Especially, 
farmers with lower-asset bases are more significantly affected by credit constraints than 
those in higher-asset classes (Kumar, Turvey, Kropp, 2013). 
 The target group of this RCC is small households in developing countries. This 
group of farmers will be significantly influenced by extreme weather events, and 
meanwhile, their situations can be changed positively by applying credit-enhancing 
instruments, such as RCC during the production.  
 
1.2.2 Risk Contingent Credit  
Weather insurance can help small farmers access the capital market by using 
RCC-embedded financial instrument provided by the counterparties. For those 
counterparties, RCC-embedded financial instrument provides those players an 
opportunity to initiate a new business and generate profit. With access to RCC, farmers 
can maintain a higher production level, and ultimately use new technology in 
agricultural production to increase production efficiency and hedge against negative 
weather shocks. Given the objectivity of credit-linked characteristics, RCC-embedded 
financial products can align interests for both farmers and insurers, which solves the 
agency problem. Compared with traditional claim-based insurance, new index-based 
insurance can shape the farmers’ behaviors to avoid fraud, adverse selection and moral 
hazard, since index insurance payouts depends on measures of an external benchmark, 
and not on case-by-case assessments of individual’s loss. This objective characteristic 
cannot be manipulated and therefore, it guarantees the accuracy of the insurance. 
Offering agricultural insurance and agricultural credit has potential to raise an agency 
problem, which indicates conflict of interest between small households and insurance 
issuers under current situation in agricultural insurance.   
Linked-credit products or risk contingent credit is a good solution to this 
problem. In addition, the fact that most small farmers live in remote areas in Kenya 
increases the cost of traditional claim-based insurance. This new insurance can decrease 
the transaction cost, because agents will have different means of information 
verification, and payout determination, which is much cheaper than traditional claim-
based insurance. For example, poor infrastructure construction, such as road 
transportation, will make it expensive for appraisers to go to the field to examine the 
real loss, while the new insurance can simply use rainfall measurements collected by 
weather stations, recorded remotely. 
The effectiveness of credit-linked insurance would depend heavily on how well 
basis risks and covariate risks are accounted for. Any model with poor quality results 
won’t solve misbehavior problems significantly, and farmers won’t benefit from the 
insurance. Also, corresponding laws, regulations, and infrastructure are also 
considerations in designing credit-linked insurance. For example, when pricing the 
insurance, the research team will refer to historical data and apply innovative 
technologies, such as remote sensors, to create an accurate benchmark. A complete 
infrastructure for measuring rainfall and insuring against rain failures would ensure that 
farmers secure a stable income, which comes from the sales of their agricultural product, 
insurance repayment, or both.  
This thesis seeks to find an accurate way to price weather-index insurance, so 
that basis risk can be reduced, and actual rainfall pattern can be implemented into 
insurance pricing mechanism. Rainfall is the only factor that affects interest premium. 
More parameters, such as temperature, and soil moisture, will be discussed later, as well 
as the correlation among these factors.  
1.2.3 Credit-Rationing  
Default risk and the size of potential losses are two main factors used to assess 
credit risk. High default probabilities of small farmers in Kenya makes traditional 
agricultural insurance unprofitable. In addition, fear of losing their collateral, which is 
a typical example of risk-rationing (Boucher, S.R., Carter, M.R., Guirkinger, C. 2008; 
Verteramo-Chiu, Khantachavana, Turvey, 2014), also drives farmers away from 
traditional insurance products (Stiglitz, Weiss, 1981).  
The definition of risk rationing is officially put forward by Boucher (2008):” 
Risk rationing occurs when insurance markets are absent, and lenders, constrained by 
asymmetric information, shift so much contractual risk to the borrower that the borrower 
voluntarily withdraws from the credit market even when he had the collateral wealth 
needed to qualify for a loan contract.”  
Farmers’ risk rationing behaviors in other developing countries, such as China 
and Mexico were intensively investigated previously (Verteramo-
Chiu, Khantachavana, Turvey, 2014). Results turn out to be that risk rationing does exist 
among farmers in China and Mexico. Therefore, risk enhancing activities supported by 
RCC will significantly change farmers behaviors, if RCC product can make lending 
more accessible and inexpensive to farmers (Verteramo-Chiu, Khantachavana, Turvey, 
2014).  
In a traditional insurance market, farmers are required to deposit productive 
assets as collateral in exchange for credit. However, in the case of weather-index 
insurance, farmers only pay a premium which represents an mean of the expected loss, 
and hence farmers don’t have to be afraid of losing productive collateral due to extreme 
weather events. However, during the repayment of the insurance, there are type I error 
and type II error about basis risk. For example, type II indicates that there is drought 
and farmers’ production is negatively affected, however, the insurance is not triggered. 
Similar situation may happen on type I error. It indicates that there is no drought, 
however, the RCC product is exercised and farmers get paid, even though they don’t 
suffer from the drought.  
An efficient weather index-insurance market would make credit markets more 
accessible to small farmers and therefore contribute to increase in productivity, as 
farmers would be able to free more resources to buy machinery, higher quality seed and 
fertilizer, and more technologically advanced equipment that would aid in protecting 
their crops from increasingly volatile weather changes. Of course, risks in different areas 
of Kenya are not the same, and so the actual premium must be modified accordingly to 
reflect different risks associated with different regions.  
 
1.2.4 Poverty Trap 
Adverse weather shocks put farmers in Kenya into a poverty trap. Small 
households can be easily put into poverty trap due to vulnerability to weather shocks, if 
they can’t have a stable cash flow. However, with the help of RCC, farmers can maintain 
a stable cash flow in either good or bad weather conditions. For example, during the 
harvest time, farmers can generate cash flow by selling crop; however, during the 
drought season, farmers can get compensated by RCC product accordingly.  
Poverty indicates that farmers can’t generate income which is sufficient to cover 
their basic consumption needs. There are many reasons that cause poverty. First, farmers 
own few assets, or the assets are of a low quality. Second, households don’t have 
sufficient access to technology, capital or credit due to poor local infrastructure or lack 
of required knowledge. Third, poor enforcement of laws and regulations will also 
contribute to poverty.  A poverty trap is a dynamic equilibrium, tied to the agricultural 
production levels for households (Barnett, Skees, 2008). If the level of production is 
above a certain threshold, production will increase to a high-output equilibrium. If the 
level of production is below that threshold, production will diminish to a low-output 
equilibrium below the poverty line, which means that farmers could fall into a poverty 
trap.  
Farmers with different levels of wealth will have different losses due to the same 
weather shocks. For example, wealthy farmers are likely to have more advanced 
technologies that reduce the losses caused by weather. However, small households, 
recovering from weather shocks, will face greater difficulties than wealthy farmers due 
to their lack of resources. RCC-embedded instruments, which facilitate the connections 
between farmers and public financial markets, provides a feasible solution for this 
complicated problem.  
 
1.2.5 Basis Risk 
One major risk of a weather-based index is basis risk, which indicates that the 
risk that payoffs of a hedging instrument don’t correspond to the underlying exposure 
(Norton, Turvey, Osgood, 2012). Basis risk creates two issues for agricultural insurance: 
on the one hand, even if farmers suffer from extreme weather events, they don’t get paid 
because the trigger of the insurance wasn’t exercised. On the other hand, farmers will 
receive indemnity due to the mismatch between the trigger and actual rainfall, and the 
amount of the indemnity is higher than the actual loss caused by the adverse events. 
High basis risk undermines the willingness of potential customers to purchase weather 
insurance.  
Due to poor information infrastructure in Africa, accurate data is scarce, and 
limited data availability affects the accuracy of the model. The sample must be large 
enough to draw reliable results, but many data are not available, which poses a 
challenging problem that needs to be overcome in order for accurate pricing models to 
be determined. Without enough data to estimate the model, the efficiency of the 
insurance is in jeopardy. For example, rainfall record is a significant factor in RCC 
product pricing procedure, and data set we used here is provided by CHIRPS (Climate 
Hazards Group InfraRed Precipitation with Station data). The interval between two 
observations is 10 days, and it ranges from 1980 to 2016.  
 
1.2.6 Covariate Risk 
In designing the insurance, covariate risk, also known as systematic risk, will 
significantly influence the performance of the insurance. For weather-index insurance, 
covariate risk refers to the tendency of extreme weather events to influence an area and 
its neighboring areas simultaneously. Systematic risk will potentially cause insurance 
companies to suffer from huge losses, thus making such weather-index insurance less 
attractive for them to design. Insurance companies can’t avoid systematic risk within 
their portfolios, because almost all farmers in a given area will encounter similar 
weather shocks, meaning they cannot effectively diversify against this risk at a local 
level. In the case of extreme events, such as droughts, spatial correlations will be more 
obvious, as a large area will be effected contemporaneously. Nonetheless, insurance 
companies can diversify systematic risks within their international portfolio, by insuring 
across many regions with different weather patterns. 
 
1.3 Research Problem  
The research problem lies in designing a fairly-priced financial instrument. 
There are two key risks related to designing the model for insurance, namely the 
covariate risks and basis risks. For RCC to be effective, it must be determined how to 
price the insurance, and this needs to be established on an actuarial basis. 
The current pilot program, implemented in September 2017, bases insurance 
calculations on the Pert Distribution, which is derived from the historical rainfall data 
measured by remote sensors. An alternative approach is to use ARIMA processes to 
measure the forward risks and price the insurance accordingly. Output generated from 
ARIMA model will be compared with the output from Pert Distribution, which is 
currently being employed. SARIMA model is used here as an alternative method 
because we want build a model for equally-spaced observations with periodic pattern. 
With the help SARIMA model, we can either capture the connection from both the 
previous month and also the months one year ago.  
 
 
 
 
1.4 Overall objective and secondary objective  
The aim of this thesis is to create a model to simulate rainfall and generate input 
for more accurate insurance pricing. In this regard, there are two methods, namely the 
pert distribution model and time series ARIMA model. A trigger, which is a regression 
result generated by historical rainfall data, will be selected according to the simulation 
results.  
Currently, the pert distribution method is being applied in pilot program in 
Kenya. An ARIMA model will be introduced here to generate another possible input for 
the pricing of the insurance. Results from two different methods will be compared, and 
the better one will be selected as the input for the insurance pricing model.  
 
1.5 Roadmap of Thesis 
In this paper, pert distribution and time series model will be applied to simulate 
the pattern of rainfall. The rainfall data set, provided by the Kenyan government, 
contains bi-weekly rainfall records from ten locations in Kenya, over a span of 35 years. 
One location has been chosen as an example to apply rainfall simulation. 
For the pert distribution, risk will determine the parameters of model. For the 
time series analysis, seasonal ARIMA (Auto-Regressive Integrated Moving Average) 
will be applied to capture rainfall characteristics. With the results of these two models, 
a benchmark for the trigger of this index insurance can be created. 
With this weather-index credit solution, smallholder farmers can pay an 
affordable interest premium that is connected to the underlying drought risk, and deal 
with the rainfall uncertainty more easily in their production decisions. There is a trade-
off between the interest rate charged on the loan, which has an embedded option, and 
the collateral requirement for the loan. For farmers with limited collaterals, or who fear 
losing their collaterals, the insurance is an effective way to hedge risks, and it is an 
affordable substitute for providing collateral (Carter, 2007). 
Most importantly, risk-contingent credit is a financial product that deals with the 
downside risk, especially drought, and this index insurance can also stimulate both the 
supply and the demand of the insurance product.  
 
1.6 Summary of Thesis 
The second chapter is a literature review that provides more details about the 
background and the economic theories of the paper. The third chapter introduces the 
pert distribution method and the time series method. The fourth chapter examines results 
generated by these two models, and the fifth has the conclusion, along with directions 
for future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Risk Contingent Credit Review and the Kenya Pilot Project 
2.1 Introduction  
Kenya lies in the east of Africa, and has high temperatures and low rainfall. 
Small household farmers in Kenya are vulnerable to weather shocks, and there is a need 
for a new financial instrument to hedge against weather risks. Traditional insurance can 
widen farmers’ access to credit markets, but it has its own shortcomings. (1). Moral 
hazard and asymmetric information are inevitable in traditional insurance environments. 
(2). Loss verification based on individual claims can be costly, especially for remote 
areas. (3). Traditional insurance companies will be reluctant to lend money to those risky 
small farmers, due to high default probability, which is a risk rationing issue and it will 
be discussed in detail later; however, there are needs existing among farmers. Even 
though small households are willing to pay a higher premium to purchase the insurance, 
companies still have their concerns about the cost of those transactions, due to farmers’ 
vulnerability to extreme weather events. (4). Poor transportation networks impede small 
farmers from using capital markets physically. (5). Subsidies are controversial, and can 
be unaffordable for local governments. On the one hand, subsidy from local government 
can reduce the cost of issuance of the insurance immediately and therefore attract more 
insurance companies to participate in the provision of the insurance; on the other hand, 
direct subsidy may distort the market structure. It distorts the relationship between 
supply and demand. If external subsidy is removed from the market, the demand for the 
insurance may collapse significantly (Makaudze, E. 2012). These are the real problems 
farmers in Kenya currently face. This chapter will provide more detailed background 
information about pilot program in Kenya and weather-index insurance.  
 2.1.1 Risk Transfer Methods 
There are many ways to transfer risk. For example, “Semi-formal microfinance 
and socially-constructed reciprocity obligations within village, family, religious 
community are informal ways to do risk management” (Coate & Ravallion, 1993; 
Fafchamps & Lund, 2003; Grimard, 1997; Rosenzweig, 1988; Townsend, 1994, 1995).   
Informal microfinance mainly focuses on small households directly. Semi-
formal microfinance brings local cooperative organizations, government, and 
international non-profit organizations into the effort to help small household farms. 
Besides the traditional methods mentioned above, RCC is an innovative 
financial product, which provides a new and flexible way to make repayment. The 
repayment mechanism makes it more practical and appropriate for risk management. 
For small farmers, insurance is an efficient way to transfer risks. For the insurance 
companies, the risk can then be diversified away across their portfolio of different 
regions. 
In many extremely poor areas, even informal risk transfer methods are not 
widely available. If farmers are well-funded like many wealthy peers, they can use their 
own income to purchase additional assets to hedge and to improve the efficiency of 
production. However, in Africa, capital flow is impeded by high transaction cost due to 
the lack of risk transfer mechanism. It will be expensive for farmers to detect potentially 
possible ways to borrow money, due to the lack of effective information platform. 
Meanwhile, lack of effective information platform is also a problem for insurance 
company to find potential clients who have demands in the external help to hedge 
themselves against drought.   
A risk transfer mechanism can be influenced by many external factors, such as 
risk aversion, financial liquidity, understanding of the product, trust in the provider and 
access to the market (Jensen, Mude, Barrett, 2014). The characteristics of target clients 
and the local infrastructure will influence the effectiveness of risk management, which 
requires that researchers not focus solely on the insurance and consider other external 
factors such as the size of the loan, timing of the insurance, and repayment function of 
the insurance, when they try to apply this risk transfer product locally.  
 
2.2 Background of RCC 
Risk contingent credit is a risk management method, which connects the 
payoffs of the loan and the performance of underlying asset, which is rainfall here. 
RCC uses underlying indicators, such as rainfall here to quantify the level of drought. 
The RCC can attract risk-rationed farmers to use credit, because RCC removes the 
possibility of losing all collaterals caused by the failure of paying back the loan on 
time. Finally, RCC can transfer risk from farmers, who are borrowers of the credit to 
the lender by getting access to credit market and using agricultural insurance. 
Compared to traditional credit tools which required collateral, RCC is more flexible 
for farmers, because the cost of using RCC is the premium charged on the loan, which 
is more affordable than the potential loss the whole productive asset.  
 
 
 
 Figure 2.1: Risk Contingent Credit Illustration 
 
Figure 2.1 explains the mechanism of RCC. RCC requires farmers to pay risk 
premium, which is incorporated with local risk factor, and it insures against drought. 
The upper graph shows that the amount of loan repayment is related to drought. Before 
the threshold, which is the numeric benchmark defined drought, loan repayment is 
positively correlated to rainfall. The lower graph indicates the payout function of the 
loan, which is negatively correlated with rainfall. It shows that if rainfall goes above the 
trigger, there is no drought in the area, and technically speaking, farmers can have a 
sustainable product which can generate enough money to support the production in the 
following season.  
 
2.2.1 Interest Premium Formula 
The input trigger, which is a quantile threshold, is generated through simulation, 
and will be put into premium calculation equation. If actual rainfall falls below the 
trigger, then the insurance will be executed to repay the loan. In the following function, 
rainfall simulation result will be converted into an interest rate result, which includes 
the insurance premium.  
 
(Shee, 2015 and Turvey, 2012) 
The variables in the above equation are defined as follows. 
T: Time length. Here T=1, which is 1 year.                                                                                                                 
 : Hedge ratio. A leverage ratio, which indicates farmers don’t take any financial 
leverage to multiply their losses or profits when it is equal to 1.                                                                                                         
f=Z, which is the trigger of this put option-embedded instrument, given that the hedge 
ratio equals 1. Because the insurance will compensate for the drought, which means that 
actual rainfall is smaller than estimated , we can consider this insurance as a put option, 
because put option will be exercised only when the underlying asset price (actual rainfall) 
is lower than the strike price (input trigger).                                                                                                          
 : Average return of this option, and the unit is in mm 
(rainfall). Z is the trigger level for the local rainfall, and P(T) is the actual local rainfall.  
The expected rainfall payoffs are different for different plots. Even for same plot, 
the trigger will be different between long rain season and short rain season. Under the 
current situation, the product is designed to be a put-option embedded instrument, and 
it can also be designed as a call option, which is designed to compensate for a flood.                                                                                                              
 i**: base interest rate. It will generally be adjusted according to the local interest rate, 
and here the default value is 12%.  
After plugging in all these parameters, new interest rate will be calculated. 
Furthermore, we assume that there is a 25% profit margin for the insurance company. 
The final premium should be the original premium plus a 25% profit margin. 
Finally, insurance provides a flexible option for farmers, and it is a substitute for 
a traditional collateral deposit. This method reduces farmers’ debt obligations (Shee, 
Turvey, 2012), because it removes the pre-requirement of collateral, and it provides a 
dynamic way to connect environmental factors and actual underlying production.  
The equation above is a general formula used to calculate the premium. Next, a 
more accurate version will be provided, which considers the rainfall effects of both long 
rain and short rain. Ultimately, the formula will provide a concrete interest premium to 
charge.  
The loss of rainfall is calculated as .  is the trigger, which 
this thesis is going to focus on. Indicates the difference between actual 
rainfall and benchmark. Since the trigger is an objective number based on historical 
rainfall pattern and can’t be manipulated by an individual, the insurance removes the 
risks of moral hazard. is the probability distribution function of rainfall. 
Finally, the mean rainfall loss will be calculated as follows: 
(0, ( , ))i i i iMax Z R t T iZ
( , ))i i i iZ R t T
( , )i i i ig R t T
 
    (1) 
According to the function above, the expectation of the rainfall repayment can 
be written as an integral whose lower bound is the historical lowest rainfall and its upper 
bound is the insurance trigger.  It is the the difference between the trigger and actual 
rainfall times the probability distribution of the actual rainfall. It compensates farmers 
only in a drought. If actual rainfall exceeds the trigger value, the payoff of the insurance 
is 0.  
Finally, a tick value is calculated as  
  (2) 
where  is the loan principal, or the size of the insurance package.  
Indicates the minimum rainfall on record. The tick value is the price of loss in rainfall 
per mm, which translates rainfall loss into monetary repayment. It is a conversion 
between lost rainfall (mm) and loan amount (local currency unit).  
If actual rainfall falls below the trigger, then farmers will be compensated 
according to the difference between the benchmark and actual rainfall. Therefore, a 
severe drought condition will be compensated more than a less severe drought condition, 
other things constant. If actual rainfall falls below the minimum historical rainfall level, 
then farmers don’t have to repay the loan, and the only cost for them is the insurance 
premium they paid in advance.  
  (3) 
The equation above indicates the present value of loan repayment after 
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considering rainfall failures in both the short rain and the long rain season.  is the 
bank’s cost of capital.  Indicates the standard interest rate on operating loans. is 
the future value of principal at a standard interest rate without considering rainfall 
failures. However, this equation doesn’t consider the correlation between the long rain 
and the short rain. Since there is a positive correlation between them, failure of one 
rainfall season is a predictor of the failure of another rainfall season. Thus, the equation 
below tries to capture this kind of correlation.  
  
(4) 
Moreover, the equation above reflects expected losses of rainfall after 
considering the rainfall difference between benchmark and actual rainfall for both the 
long rain season and the short rain season. A joint probability distribution function is 
applied here to calculate the expected value.   
  (5) 
Therefore, after substituting v into the original equation, a corresponding present 
value of the operating loan can be concluded from the equation above.  
   (6) 
This equation calculates the present value of loan without rainfall risk and 
imbedded insurance. This number is the mean of the index insurance needed to price 
this product fairly. Especially, for i **, it can be considered as a mean value after 
considering both the long rain shortage and short rain shortage.  
Technically speaking, result from (5) should be equal to result from (6), since 
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equation (5) considers two actual rainfall seasons, and equation (6) is an expected value 
for the whole season. Therefore, we can equate (5) and (6) and get: 
 (7) 
  After solving (7), finally we get a modified version of the interest premium: 
. 
This equation is equivalent to the equation below, after plugging in each 
individual term. Compared to its original version, this equation distinguishes explicitly 
between both long rain and short rain.  
 (8) 
 
 
2.3 Overview of Machakos County Pilot Project  
The current pilot program in Machakos County in Kenya is an application of 
RCC, aiming to provide alternative methods for small households to do risk transfer. 
Annual rainfall of this area is low, and farmers are facing production problems brought 
by drought. Pilot program focuses on rainfall in 11 plots in Kenya. Farmers in Kenya 
begin the production for the following season by selling crop in the previous season. If 
the sales of the production don’t meet the amount of the previous loan, farmers will fail 
to pay back the loan directly, due to their low protection level in drought. This cycle is 
vulnerable to drought, and farmers in Kenya need an efficient alternative method 
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besides traditional loan to finish self-hedging.    
Extreme weather events, especially drought, damage agricultural production in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Lack of credible credit history makes it risky for an insurance 
company to issue related financial products to help farmers hedge risks in production. 
To guarantee the quality and reduce the cost of the insurance, issuers of the insurance 
tend to impose collateral requirements as a deposit toward the loan in advance, which 
discourages farmers from applying the insurance. Farmers are credit-rationed on 
collateral. In a sense, if farmers know there is a possibility of losing their productive 
asset once they fail to pay back the loan, they may choose to withdraw the loan 
voluntarily.  
Figure 2.2: Map of Machakos 
 
This RCC pilot area covers eleven divisions in the Machakos County including 
Central Machakos, Yathui, Yatta, Masinga, Matungulu, Kalama, Kathiani, Mwala, 
Kangundo, Ndithini, and Mavoko, which can be seen from graph above. In those areas, 
uninsured risks are a major cause of low agricultural productivity, and droughts affect 
the local agricultural production negatively. With 80% of the population in these areas 
employed in agriculture and 22% of country’s overall GDP derived from agriculture. 
Therefore, agricultural production in Kenya is a critical issue (Shee, Turvey, You, 2015). 
Application of RCC product can enhance agricultural production for Kenya, and finally 
improve the well-being of local population.  
Maize is the dominant crop in the area with intercropping with perennial fruits 
or other cash crops (Shee, Turvey, You, 2015). There are two major rainfall seasons in 
Kenya. One is the long rain, which begins from October 15th to January 15th, and the 
other is the short rain, which begins from March 15th to May 15th. There is a positive 
correlation between two rainfall seasons, and failure in any rainfall season be associated 
with crop failures in the other season.  
 
2.3.1 Some Observations from Pilot Project 
According to survey data collected from pilot program, there are 1166 
observations and 33 variables within the dataset. Variables include rationing group, 
treatment, location, age, education, genders, income, and expenditures. Farmers are 
assigned into different categories of the insurance, including: RCC, Normal Credit and 
Control during the pilot. Risk-contingent credit is the innovative financial instrument 
that this thesis is going to focus on. Normal credit is the traditional loan provided by the 
local banks or government.  
  According to the results from the survey, 42% of the households are risk-
rationed and voluntarily withdraw themselves from the credit market (Shee, Turvey, You, 
2015). Therefore, there is a great demand for credit-insurance product as a substitute for 
the traditional loan method.  
The profiles of farmers are significantly different. For example, the proportion 
of a farmer’s budget spent on food ranges from 4.32% to 99.70%. The mean percentage 
of food expense among the sum of all expenditures is 27.46%, the median is 27.47% 
with a variance of 0.0323. The first quantile of the percentage is 13.39%, and third 
quantile of percentage is 38.09%. More details can be found in graph below.  
Wealthy farmers will influence the acceptance rate and the effectiveness of the 
insurance. For example, for farmers who are at the bottom of the wealth level 
distribution, weather-index insurance won’t be helpful for them, since they cannot 
afford the premium of the insurance. Meanwhile, for some wealthy farmers, who 
already have a set of efficient technological methods to hedge against weather risks, 
they won’t find weather index-insurance useful either.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Food Expense Percentage Among Total Budget 
 
Source: Kenya Pilot program 
 
42.11% of farmers who were surveyed said that they didn’t apply for loan from 
bank/ cooperative organization, while 28.99% of farmers didn’t answer this question, 
and only 28.9% of farmers said that they had previous experience in credit leverage. 
This data indicates that farmers are not experienced with credit use. With education and 
guidance, farmers will become familiar with these credit options, and therefore, they 
will be more willing to use those instruments to hedge.  
The pilot program was exercised by game design, which indicates that given 
other situations unchanged, farmers will be provided with different products in 
insurance, such as traditional loan, RCC, and no insurance. The goal is to evaluate the 
feasibility of RCC and understand the behaviors of potential customers. After 
understanding the mechanism of RCC and insurance, survey data indicates that the 
insurance has great potential demand among farmers (Shee, Turvey, Woodward, 2015).  
 2.4 Other Consideration in Design RCC 
2.4.1 Internal Risk Management Method 
  Small farmers have difficulty applying innovative technologies (such as those in 
fertilizers and machinery) to improve their production efficiency. To improve the 
demand for, and efficiency of, the insurance, there are many accompanying 
interventions. 
Small farmers adjust their budget when they are facing extreme weather events, 
and they need to limit their spending on other expenditures. For example, to maintain 
an income level, farmers may take actions, such as skipping meals or removing their 
kids from school, that are obviously harmful to production in a long run.  
Even though weather-index insurance is a powerful tool to solve poverty issues 
in Africa, researchers still need to find other complementary approaches to execute 
together with insurance. Finally, regulations and laws are necessary in the promotion of 
this product from pilot experiment to commercial and public level. 
 
2.4.2 External Risk Management Method  
Education and professional personnel are needed in the implementation of this 
product, because farmers have no knowledge of the insurance. For example, if this year 
doesn’t have extreme events, such as drought and flood, according to the design of the 
insurance, the trigger of the insurance won’t be triggered. Small households may think 
that insurance companies are cheating them, and this misunderstanding will discourage 
them from buying the insurance in the next year. 
Farmers in Africa tend to build a portfolio to diversify risks during their 
production by growing different crops or having both crops and livestock. Single crop 
insurance may not be enough to cover all risks exposed the market. Poor transportation 
may also prevent farmers from getting physical access to credit.  
If households understood the mechanism of the insurance by attending classes 
held by either the insurance companies or the local government, they would be more 
willing to purchase this product to hedge risks. Education can eliminate confusion and 
misunderstanding among farmers when the insurance company introduces weather-
index insurance. There are many internal factors, such as basis risks, that will also 
influence the acceptance of the insurance. If the correlation between the indicators, such 
as rainfall, temperature, and actual environment is not strong the insurance’s 
effectiveness in risk management will be stymied and the insurance won’t attain its 
expected performance. For example, suppose that indicators show that during this crop 
year, an area has no loss, but farmers do suffer from crop failure. This discrepancy will 
damage the credibility of the insurance and dampen the acceptance rate of the product.  
Spatiotemporal adverse selection is another factor the insurers will have to 
consider, which will cast considerable influence on final acceptance of the insurance.  It 
is believed that if farmers can have some methods to know the performance of next crop 
season in advance, they will have a pre-diagnosis about whether to buy the insurance or 
not (Jensen, Mude, Barrett, 2014).  
For example, farmers can use social media or experience to predict the weather 
of the following season and therefore they can make decisions on whether to use the 
insurance for next production season. If they have a promising expectation of the next 
season’s weather, they will decline the insurance. This spatiotemporal adverse selection 
will be burdensome to insurance company, because if farmers’ prediction is correct with 
a high probability, insurance company can’t make a profit during good years and only 
makes payments during bad years, which will make it impossible for the insurance 
company to generate enough profit to break even in the long run. 
Finally, both internal and external factors will influence the acceptance rate of 
the insurance and the profitability of the insurance company. According to results from 
the underlying pilot program, current demand for the insurance is low, and the number 
of farmers who intend to buy the insurance is low.  
 
2.4.3 Basis Risk  
2.4.3.1 Local Basis Risk 
It is not hard to understand that a pleasant weather condition leads to high 
production, and local farmers can use weather contingent contracts in mercantile 
exchange to hedge. However, the imperfect correlation between the contract, which is 
an indicator of weather, and production, will cause a failure in the hedge. The correlation 
embedded in the contract is likely to be different from the actual correlation. For 
example, different crop growth stages have different requirement of rainfall, and so 
different farmers may be impacted differently by rainfall events.  
For example, agricultural insurance in Kenya insures the sum of the rainfall 
within a specific period, whether during the long rain or short rain. However, the sum 
may not capture the specific rainfall requirement of crop accurately, since farmers may 
need more rain in a particular period to keep their crops alive. Even though total rainfall 
over the year was enough, if the crops die due to insufficient rain in early months, then 
the farmer is still harmed, but cannot be compensated by insurance. 
 
2.4.3.2 Geographic Basis Risk 
The mismatch between the insured areas and the areas which are covered in the 
contract will also cause basis risk. So, if farmers use a non-local city contract to hedge 
themselves from weather shock, it won’t be an effective hedge for their productions. 
The payout of nearby location is a good reference to local payout (Norton, Turvey, 
Osgood). However, due to lack of previous premium, it is impossible for weather-index 
insurance to apply pricing method.  
Small households in Kenya can choose the insurance products that insure an area 
that has a similar pattern. However, once the insured area and actual production area 
have a different rainfall pattern, farmers who use this kind of method may have a high 
chance of suffering a loss without compensation.  
 
 
2.4.3.3 Product Basis Risk 
Farmers can choose different indicators to use in contracts to protect themselves, 
and different indicators, such as precipitation and temperature, will have different 
effectiveness in hedging. For example, in cotton production, temperature may play a 
more significant role than precipitation. However, the quantitative correlations are hard 
to measure and therefore, it can be difficult to find a concrete number for each contract. 
For cotton producers, if rainfall and temperature are weighted equally in the contract, it 
will cause a failure in hedging.  
After understanding pattern of a single indicator, more indicators and 
correlations would also be considered in model construction. For example, rainfall may 
not be the only factor that affects crop production. Temperature and other indicators also 
have an influence on production, but more indicators and correlations make it more 
complicated for researchers when designing the product. The introduction of new and 
effective indicators will help to capture typical rainfall pattern of local area.  
 
2.5 Related Program  
Before weather-index insurance, there are other commodity-linked credit 
instruments in Kenya. Big farmers, manufacturers, and farmers who have strong capital 
foundation and required knowledge, will use commodity-linked bonds, which increases 
their exposures to capital markets, and reduces their financial risk (Turvey, 2006). 
 
2.5.1 Direct Cash Payment Method  
HSNP (Hunger Safety Net Programme) is more efficient to the poorest farmers, 
because they are the group of people who even don’t have enough capital to purchase 
the insurance and don’t have the productive tools to maintain a sufficient daily 
production. Insurance and subsidy won’t benefit them directly. Ultimately, these 
improvements will lead to an overall increase in agricultural productivity. In a long run, 
improvements in agricultural sectors will lead to improvements in non-agricultural 
sectors, too.  
The cost of these programs is a critical issue that researchers cannot avoid 
considering. Operating and administrative costs, such as expense in marketing and 
monitoring, are high. The duration of direct cash payment is uncertain, because a cash 
payment program only wants to help the poorest farmers to reach a sustainable level of 
production. Certainly, the program needs to last for a long time and have a strong 
funding foundation so that it can support farmers to become independent gradually and 
finally get out of poverty trap. The capital requirement can be burdensome for local 
government and donor communities.  
Opportunity cost is another factor that needs consideration when apply direct 
cash payment method. That’s to say, the funds used for cash payment may help the poor 
more effectively if applied to other more promising and profitable programs. This 
“misdistribution” in resource arrangement will affect the development of the whole 
economy.  
An insurance program applies different methods from a direct cash payment 
program, and it will be discussed in detail in a later part. Insurance can reach comparable 
results to direct payment when farmers are facing a catastrophic weather event, and the 
households who benefit from this product are generally different from the group of 
people who receive the benefit from direct cash payment. The selection of these two 
methods will be determined by clients’ situations and budget of the program.  
Currently, political intervention plays a significant role in dealing with covariate 
risk when farmers are facing extreme weather events. For example, in Peru, there is a 
debt forgiveness policy, which significantly increases the default probabilities of many 
borrowers. This intervention causes an unhealthy feedback loop between the 
unwillingness to issue similar instrument from insurance issuers and higher and higher 
default rate from customers.  
Sub-Saharan Africa is a place that is vulnerable to weather fluctuations, because 
there are many small and poor households living there, and their income comes 
predominantly from agricultural production, which is very sensitive to weather shocks. 
The high frequency of climate change and increasing occurrence of extreme weather 
events makes farmers more exposed to risks than before. 
Technically speaking, in agriculture, there are two methods to cover loss caused 
by these unpredictable weather patterns, which are risk minimization and loss 
management. Risk minimization refers to the plans and strategic decisions made before 
production, such as crop diversification and intercropping. Loss management refers to 
the makeup reactions after certain shocks, such as off-farm employment and self-
insuring behavior. Weather index insurance can be considered as a risk minimization 
method, because it is the decision that farmers are going to make before the following 
crop season with the intent to reduce potential losses in future.  
 
2.5.2 IBLI (Index-Based Livestock Insurance)  
IBLI program focuses on assets, which are livestock, and this mechanism 
provides a reliable protection for farmers to maintain a sustainable level of production. 
Assets are necessary to generate income. If fundamental assets are damaged severely, 
there is low possibility to have a stable cash flow now or even in the future. Especially 
in agricultural production, loss of productive assets will put or lock small households 
into the poverty trap. According farmers’ experience and previous research, livestock’s 
mortality is affected significantly by external environment. Farmers who bought IBLI 
will be paid according to the difference between benchmark and their actual livestock 
mortality. This is a dynamic process, and farmers may get different amount of repayment 
based on different weather conditions during the insured time interval.   
When designing the index-based insurance, researchers and local governments 
consider scalability and sustainability of this product as well. Scalability refers to the 
expansion of the product from small pilot project to a standardized commercial product 
and a broader market. Sustainability refers to that RCC products should have a long-
term viability in commercial markets, which requires that it should both benefit 
customers and issuers. If the premium of the insurance is too low, issuers may have 
trouble breaking even after paying the claims on the insurance. If the premium goes 
beyond the customers’ maximum willingness to pay, the demand for the insurance will 
be too low.  
The mechanism of the insurance, social infrastructure construction, and 
regulatory enforcement will influence the sustainability of the insurance. For a 
sustainable commercial product, its premium should cover all costs of providing the 
insurance. Premium can be divided into two parts. One is pure premium, which refers 
to the expected payments to total amount of money insured. This is the cost that farmers 
should pay in advance to protect themselves and get paid in the future, if a drought or a 
flood happens. Another part of the premium is the operating cost, which refers to the 
expenses incurred when issuers design and administer this product, such as marketing, 
training, and data collection. 
In Africa, livestock is a major income resource for households, and it can be 
significantly affected by weather, such as rainfall and temperature. According to 
previous research results, drought-related factors accounted for 53% of the livestock 
deaths. Disease, which is correlated with drought will, accounted for another 30% of 
deaths during the same period (McPeak, Little & Doss 2012). Therefore, it is easy to 
see the importance of index insurance, because livestock’s mortality rate is positively 
correlated with weather indicators, such as rainfall and temperature.  
The methodology of this insurance is transferable. However, weather-index 
insurance is still hard to replicate because different areas will have different prominent 
characteristics that influence the local environment. Ideally, researchers will want to 
identify the most relevant ones when setting the benchmark. 
According to the results from IBLI program (Jensen, Mude, Barrett, 2014), due 
to macroeconomic uncertainty and cultural preferences, farmers tend to keep livestock 
as a store of value. However, livestock is an asset with low liquidity, and so this method 
has an obvious shortage. According to the laws of supply and demand, if quantity 
supplied, given the price, is higher than quantity demanded, given the price, then there 
is a surplus of the product, and the price of product will go down. Similarly, for livestock 
market, if covariate shocks happen, all nearby farmers will tend to sell their livestock to 
liquidate the asset and therefore, the price that farmers can get by selling livestock now 
will be lower than the price that they would get in years without weather shock. 
Therefore, this method is not be an effective way to maintain a stable cash flow. Due to 
the instability of self-insured method, some farmers may prefer to take advantage of 
external methods to hedge risks, like weather-index insurance. 
IBLI is a regular pilot program in Kenya, which is sold twice each year. There 
are two windows for farmers to purchase the insurance. These two purchasing times are 
the long rain season, which is from January to February, and the short rain season, which 
is from August to September. Therefore, farmers will have flexibility to choose which 
time periods they want the insurance to cover.  
During the pilot program of IBLI, some problems occurred, which will also need 
attention when we are dealing with the design of weather-index insurance. 
The premium charged to small households is a critical issue that researchers 
must bear in mind when they are designing with this financial instrument. According to 
the IBLI pilot experiment, farmers are sensitive to insurance premium changes, which 
indicates that a lower premium will attract more potential customers. The elasticity of 
this instrument is relatively high. Compared to a high potential repayment of the 
insurance, farmers are more interested in an insurance product with a lower premium, 
even if the potential repayment is lower.  
High premiums charged by insurers may still be attractive to highly productive 
farmers; however, they are not the targeted customers who will achieve the most gain 
from this instrument, because the target of this product is small households who are 
struggling in the poverty trap, while wealthy farmers are far beyond the threshold of 
poverty trap. Therefore, the premium charged by this type of insurance should be 
attractive to its target customers, and different premium level will attract different 
groups of farmers who belong to different income levels.  
Looking at the results of this program, there are some findings that can also be 
applied to RCC. It was designed to lessen damages caused by extreme events. In the 
long run, it was designed to help farmers get rid out of the poverty trap (Barrett, Barnett, 
Carter, 2007). 
According to pilot result, the demand for the insurance is low. Due to the lack of 
the awareness of the insurance and its characteristics, small farmers tend to undervalue 
the product, and they are unwilling to accept an expensive but correctly priced product. 
Subsidy is a problem that researchers can’t ignore during their work. The original 
intention of the subsidy is to lower the premium to increase demand. After farmers are 
getting experienced with the insurance and issuers gain more practical experience, 
subsidy can be eliminated so it becomes a competitive commercial financial instrument, 
which can be openly traded on the open market. The impact on the valuation due to a 
subsidy should be examined, and if this assessment process can’t be evaluated properly, 
then the market will tend to have negative reactions towards these subsidies. The 
introduction of financial intervention should be careful and cautious. Otherwise, it will 
jeopardize the long term sustainability of the product. 
 
2.6 Lessons  
However, there are many traps that need attention. The premium can’t reflect the 
actual value of the product, and there is a high chance of making economically 
inefficient decisions. When donors remove the subsidy, insurance companies may not 
be very confident about the number of loyal customers who are going to stick to the 
insurance even though the price of the insurance is higher than before. In addition, the 
introduction of this new product may dampen use of other risk transfer instruments on 
the market. If this problem can be addressed properly, other components in risk transfer 
instruments can combine to cover the area where index-insurance fails to be appealing.  
For insurance companies, who want to earn profit from these instruments, they 
may have concerns when they enter this new market, due to low price tolerance from 
local farmers. This premium should go below the maximum willingness to pay from 
their customers. If the price charged by insurance companies is above the willingness to 
pay of customers, a subsidy will have to be introduced. Subsidy is a common solution 
to limited capital, because it is an efficient way to stimulate both supply and demand. 
With the help of the subsidy, insurance companies can charge a higher price than the 
price without subsidy, and small farmers will be offered a comparatively lower price 
than the one without a subsidy. Subsidy will be responsible for the difference between 
these two parties. Subsidy providers, such as government and international institutions, 
can be a reliable backbone for insurance companies, because when an extreme weather 
event strikes, they can use ample capital and resources from themselves to protect 
insurance companies from collapse caused by covariate risks. However, subsidy may 
bring potential damage to the market. It may crowd out existing products due to price 
competition. It may turn out to be that insurance products without subsidy are all 
eliminated from the market, due to their higher price to consumers. In a long-run, 
subsidy distorts the operation of an efficient market, and when subsidy is removed from 
the market, existing financial products may have difficulty supporting themselves. The 
total number of insured customers in a specific location is an issue that needs 
consideration when government or donors subsidize the index-insurance.  
The burden of the insurance might be heavy for insurance companies, which is 
also the reason why insurance needs subsidy. There is another way to ameliorate the 
burden put on insurance company, which is layered-payment, that’s to say, different 
parties will be responsible for different parts of the insurance repayment.  
Small amount of loss within some budget can be covered by insurance 
companies themselves; however, when the loss goes beyond the expected budget, which 
makes the payment unaffordable to those insurance companies, governments can take 
responsibility to pay the rest part of repayment. Risk-layering can help insurance 
company transfer risks when their portfolios are not widespread enough to diversify 
systematic risks. Government or NGO will become their last line of defense, and this 
mechanism will provide an opportunity to share the loss and burden among different 
parties. Consequently, no specific party will suffer a devastating loss, and players who 
get involved to this index-insurance all can maintain a sustainable business. 
Obviously, farmers can take advantage of this financial instrument to equip 
themselves with more innovative and efficient financial instruments to maintain a stable 
cash flow in the future. Compared to direct cash payment, which is another popular way 
in Africa for the government to relieve poverty, insurance can apply indicators, which 
are easy to measure and highly related to agricultural production, to calculate repayment 
flexibly, because the repayment will be adjusted to actual environment, which is more 
flexible than direct cash payment method. Index-based insurance will decrease the 
moral hazard and adverse selection problem effectively. It doesn’t require client’s 
historical credit record, which will be helpful to insurance companies, because small 
households, especially those who live in extremely impoverished areas, don’t have these 
reports for insurance companies to refer to. 
Another interesting finding in the IBLI program is that there are different 
discounts provided by issuers to reduce households’ final premium to motivate them to 
purchase the insurance. For example, during each sales window, a randomly selected 
coupon which ranges from 10% to 60% will be applied to farmers’ premium to reduce 
farmers’ cost when they are purchasing the insurance. This is another way to increase 
the demand for the product. In the initiation of RCC product, similar strategies can be 
applied here to motivate the demands of those innovative RCC-embedded financial 
instrument.   
With the application of RCC, the risk transfer method can help farmers become 
more financially flexible for farmers because with the help of the insurance, farmers 
don’t have to rely on comparatively costly self-insurance method. The initial investment 
required to provide the insurance is huge, such as the construction of weather stations 
and high quality data collection infrastructure. There is a huge amount of preparation 
required before the application of the index insurance, such as education of customers 
and marketing to increase awareness. If the customer base of the insurance isn’t large 
enough, insurance companies will face great cost per capita. However, to guarantee the 
fitness of the insurance, insurance companies can’t apply same models to physically 
widespread areas. If these areas are too far away from one another, environmental 
conditions can vary widely. The tradeoff between greater diversification by spreading 
to new areas and the cost of estimating new models is something researchers must face 
when they are trying to implement this financial risk transfer instrument. 
For the utility industry, structured financial products also has its own benefit. 
These industries are sensitive to weather, and structured financial products provide a 
feasible way to eliminate or decrease price fluctuation risks. Meanwhile, this strategy 
also solves liquidity problems and mitigates downside weather-related risks. RCC 
applies the similar strategy here to minimize the volatilities during the agricultural 
production. Farmers will always maintain a stable cash flow either during the harvest 
season or drought season. During the harvest season, farmers can support following 
season’s production by selling crops, and during the drought season, farmers can get 
compensated according to the loss caused by drought from insurance companies by 
purchasing RCC-embedded production in advance.  
The goal of this dynamic method is to protect farmers from the poverty trap by 
providing them a more accessible credit and capital market. Weather risks put small 
farmers into the poverty trap, and limited access to capital market makes it difficult for 
farmers to get out of the trap. Under current situation, RCC can be an effective method 
to minimize the loss caused by downside risk, which is rainfall here. A complete and 
efficient access to the credit and insurance market can benefit both small farmers and 
issuers. If products can be sold through existing channels, such as existing insurance 
companies and informal insurance groups, it can be more widespread and more easily 
learned about by potential users. Farmers can use this access to know more about the 
insurance, so that they are more willing to invest in weather-index insurance. 
Correspondingly, for insurance issuers, they can also use this reliable channel to provide 
products and other accompanying service, such as education and product usage training. 
For small farmers who live in remote areas, the cost of traditional claim-based insurance 
can be high. Insurance companies at this time can make better use of mobile devices to 
reduce transaction costs and increase access to the product and service. In addition, a 
successful and complete risk management system also requires the enforcement of 
related laws and regulations, which is commonly nonexistent in those countries.  
 
Chapter 3: Data source, Characteristics and Time Series Method 
3.1 Introduction 
In chapter 2, I provided an overview of the conditions which are currently being 
faced by farmers in Kenya and proposed the structure of an RCC product to be applied 
in a pilot program. The RCC trigger is based on cumulative rainfall, using the 20% 
quantile of pert distribution. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an alternative method to RCC using 
time series model (Robert, David, 2010). A time series is a set of data recorded in time 
order. It is discrete and equally spaced. Time series forecasting is the use of past 
observed values to predict future values. Models for time series tend to have a better 
performance in a shorter term than a longer term. Therefore, a model based on recently 
observed data will be more accurate than one based on data from long time ago. 
Therefore, forecasting will be more accurate. Therefore, this paper uses more recent 
data to improve the accuracy of the forecast. 
Machakos County is a semi-arid and hilly terrain areas in Eastern province of 
Kenya. The rainfall of this area is very low, which is around 700 mm per year. (Situation 
Analysis-GOK 2014). The average rainfall in long rain and short rain is 315 mm and 
266 mm respectively. Small households in this areas are unable to do self-hedging due 
to their low wealthy level. Climate Hazards Group InfraRed Precipitation with Station 
Data (CHIRPS) is a quasi-global rainfall dataset, which provides the historical rainfall 
data of Machakos County in past 30 years.  
The goal of this chapter is to construct a seasonal time series model to reflect 
general pattern of rainfall in the pilot area. Insurance companies and local microfinance 
institutions can refer to this benchmark to price the insurance.  
Kenya lies in east of Africa. There are two rain seasons which compose a major 
percentage of rainfall in Kenya, according to local farmers’ experience. The period from 
March 15th to May 15th is the short rain, and the period from Oct 15th to Jan 15th (of 
the next year) is the long rain.  
Figure 3.1: Monthly Average Rainfall Results Across 35 Years
 
Figure 3.1 shows a cyclical and seasonal pattern of sample plots in a year. This 
pattern confirms that the long rain season and the short rain season compose a major 
percentage of rainfall within a year. In fact, the long rain season and the short rain season 
account for a majority of the rainfall, and variance during these two major rain seasons 
is large. Therefore, this adds uncertainty to farmers’ agricultural production. For small 
households, who lack capital to apply a sufficient self-insured method, will seek external 
support to protect themselves from extreme weather events.   
The data for this model is biweekly observations of rainfall from the past 35 
years. The total number of observations for this area is 420. The total rainfall for a given 
month is simply the sum of the individual rainfalls for that month.  
To capture the monthly pattern of the rainfall data, I reconstructed the data into 
12 points for each year by taking the average of the rainfall within each month. The 
rearranged data are equally spaced, and therefore can apply corresponding time series 
model. After understanding patterns of each month, results from short rain and long rain 
will be grouped up to create trigger to exercise this insurance. In addition, differencing 
( and log transformation may be applied here to improve the accuracy of the 
model.  
Figure 3.2: Time Series Plot of Monthly Rainfall for Example Area Across 1981 to 2015 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 3.2, the interval between two dashed lines indicates the length of year. 
Within each period, we can tell that there is a peak and trough. Even though the exact 
magnitude of rainfall is different from year to year, we can still detect annual patterns 
from year to year. For example, during the cycle, there is significant high rainfall and 
low rainfall, which provides the possibility in which we can use past rainfall pattern to 
forecast future rainfall pattern.  
 
Figure 3.3: Time Series Plot of Monthly Rainfall for Example Area Across 1981 to 
2015 with Trend Line 
 
 
Another regression line is drawn in Figure 3.3 to check general trend of rainfall. 
The Figure 3.3 shows no significant increasing or decreasing trend in total rainfall. 
Constant mean is one of three pre-conditions of stationarity. If there is a trend, either 
increasing or decreasing within data, we should apply extra methods to remove this 
trend.  
3.2 Model in Pilot: Pert Distribution 
In the 2017 and 2018 pilot program, PERT distribution was applied to simulate 
rainfall in Machakos County. In the simulation model, a lower 20% quantile of the 
rainfall was selected as the local trigger. Time series method applied here provides 
another way to detect local trigger. After getting results provided by two methods, we 
want to compare those two sets of results to see the difference or the similarity.  
The rainfall data of Kenya in 11 plots are provided, from 1981 to now. In each 
rainfall season, cumulative rainfall and average rainfall are recorded. Even though these 
two sets have different numbers, they have the same shape since the only difference in 
these sets is the scale. These numbers are going to be incorporated into the rainfall 
simulation later.  
 
3.3 Correlation and Covariate Risk  
One of the most critical elements of RCC is the correlations among plots in 
Machakos County. If correlations among plots are strong, it indicates that the drought 
of one plot is a strong indicator of the droughts in other plots.  
Within the long rain season, rainfall levels are highly correlated. This implies 
that if drought occurs in one plot, other plots are highly likely to have drought, too. This 
results in a potentially high covariate risk. Drought in one plot can have a significant 
influence on other plots. The Insurance Company should therefore pay close attention 
to its portfolio diversification.  
A similar matrix can be constructed between the long rain season and the short 
rain season, and, between short rain seasons. The correlations within the long rain and 
the short rain are strong across plots. The Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 show correlation 
within long rain and short rains, respectively. 
 
 Figure 3.4: Long Rain Correlation Matrix 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Short Rain Correlation Matrix 
  
 
 Figure 3.6 shows the correlation of long rains and short rains: 
Figure 3.6: Long Rain and Short Rain Combination Correlation Matrix 
 
 
According to Figure 3.4, Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6, we can tell that the 
correlation within the short rain and the long rain is strong. Correlation between long 
rain and short rain is positive, but it is significantly weaker than the correlation within 
a season, which indicates that a drought during the short rain won’t be a strong predictor 
of drought the following long rain, and vice versa.  
 
 Figure 3.7: Long Rain & Short Rain Overlapping, Central Machakos 
 
In the construction of the models, the pert distribution is chosen to simulate 
rainfall. This model has three parameters, and they are min value, mode value, and max 
value. Max and min rainfall can be found in the historical cumulative rainfall data. After 
defining the shape of model in @Risk, a mode for the rainfall will be generated 
automatically. Finally, these three parameters will be used in the following rainfall 
simulation and trigger determination.  
 
 
 
 
 Table 3.1: LR Plot 208 (Central Machakos): Simulation 
 
Min 85.306994 
Max 423.047899 
Mean 195.0542 
Mode 130.3793 
Median 180.1818 
Std. Deviation 77.1972 
Graph  
 
 
 
After processing the rainfall data, the corresponding simulation models are 
created to simulate the pattern of the rainfall. For each plot, there are 2 models, one for 
long rain and one for short rain. According to figure below, the lower 20% bound is 
120.8, which is the lower 20% quantile of the rainfall. This is the trigger that we are 
looking for in the insurance premium design.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Pert Distribution Simulation 
 
 
3.4 Data Transformation with ARIMA   
Obviously, observations in a time series are rarely independent. We should test 
the series to verify that it is stationary. After series passes this test, we can then apply 
the time series method.  
ARIMA (Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average) methods are widely used 
in time-series analysis and forecast. It has three components: autoregression (AR), 
differencing (I), and moving average (MA). Before applying ARIMA model, we should 
check stationarity of the data set. If data is not stationary, we should increase the level 
of differencing. If we ignore the trends within the data, this will damage the accuracy of 
the model. For example, the sample mean generated from previous data will fail to 
capture known patterns when predicting future values, if we don’t take trend into 
consideration in the model. 
Especially, for seasonal ARIMA model, it final presentation should be: 
ARIMA(p,d,q) (P,D,Q), where p is parameter for the non-seasonal AR model, d is 
differencing times for non-seasonal, and q is parameter for the moving average 
component. Capital P, D, and Q indicate that parameters for seasonal patterns. 
Seasonality is a regular pattern that repeats over a fixed time periods.  
Given that there is no differencing operation, a stationary process   , 
SARMA(p,q)(P,Q), can be written as: 
(1) 
Where  is a white noise process. 
In the selection of parameters, we should first find s, the order of the seasonality. 
We may first use autocorrelation function and partial autocorrelation function to find an 
MA(q), or AR(p) in non-seasonal part.  
If there are significant correlation of the s order, then we can select parameters 
for the seasonal part of the function. For example, we could use either SARMA(0,q)(0,1) 
or SARMA(p,0)(1,0). The difference between SARIMA model and SARMA model is 
differencing. During the data transformation process, if there is seasonal differencing 
between data, we should use SARIMA model. “I” in the model stands for “integrated”. 
If there is no seasonal differencing, SARIMA model and SARMA model should be 
equivalent. If there are still significant correlations around 2s, then we should consider 
a SARMA(0,q)(0,2) or SARMA(p,0)(2,0). However, if none of models above work, we 
will begin to combine AR and MA terms. For example, SARMA(1,0)(0,1), 
SARMA(1,1)(1,0) and so on.   
 
3.4.1 Stationarity  
There are three conditions that you should check for stationarity.  
1. Constant mean for all time periods. If there is significant trend, you should 
use differencing techniques to remove the trend. 
2. Constant variance for all time periods. If variance is increasing or decreasing 
with time, you should not consider the variance as constant. 
3. Autocovariance function between period t and period t+k should only 
depend on the interval, k. Any other interval with the same length should 
have the same autocovariance. This function tries to capture the dependency 
structure of the process.  
 
 
(2) 
The autocorrelation of order k can be defined as following equation:  
 (3) 
If the correlation is high, we can tell that observations within a series are highly 
correlated, and vice versa. If the time series has a trend within it, it would be necessary 
to use difference operators.  
 (4) 
If a stationary process is obtained by applying differencing operation, we say 
that  is integrated of order 1. For series with a seasonal pattern, we can also apply 
differencing operation of order S. For example: 
 (5) 
If s=4, this indicates a quarterly data. 
If s=12, this indicates a monthly data.  
3.4.2 Procedure  
Stationarity of the dataset is the first condition that is checked. After confirming 
the stationarity of series, next step is to determine the parameters of model. In this step, 
the parameters can be determined from the autocorrelation function (ACF) and partial 
autocorrelation function (PACF). The data set will be split into a training set and a test 
set to do a cross validation to test the accuracy of the model. Meanwhile, the residual of 
models will also be tested here. It should follow a normal distribution. If there is some 
other trend, either linear or non-linear, within the residuals, this indicates that model 
fails to capture some characteristics within the original series. Other data 
transformations should be applied to capture those previously undetected pattern. R was 
used to do this time-series analysis and code will be provided in appendix.  
There might be several candidate models to fit the series, and after deciding the 
parameters of the function, a cross-validation will be applied to find the precise 
parameters of the model to minimize the total sum of squared error. In addition, the 
Akaike information criterion (AIC) can be another useful tool to help determine 
appropriate parameters. 
 
3.4.3 Overfitting  
A good model should also avoid overfitting problem, and that’s to say, the order 
of this time series model should be as few as possible. This is a tradeoff between the 
bias and variance. Overfitting can be considered as modelling error, because it is 
overfitted for the training data, and therefore, it may not fit test set very well. Therefore, 
the model can become overly complex, and the predictive power of the model will be 
reduced due to overfitting. Cross validation can help to solve this problem. 
 
3.4.4 Unit Root 
The prerequisite condition to apply time series analysis is stationarity, so we 
must check the stability of time series data. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test will be 
used here to test this condition. We want to apply unit root test:  
 
 
 
A unit root indicates a random walk pattern with a stochastic trend, which 
indicates that it is inappropriate to use time series analysis here.  
(6) 
The test statistic is: 
 (7) 
:  is nonstationary. The t-statistic doesn’t follow a t, but a Dickey-Fuller (DF), 
distribution. 
 
Figure 3.9: Dickey-Fuller Distribution 
 
According to the distribution, we can see that the critical values of the DF 
distribution are more negative than those of a normal distribution. Especially, x here 
stands for a numeric vector or time series. In a Dickey-Fuller (DF) test,  assumes  
is a white noise. In Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test,  is enlarged, and it allows 
 to be an AR(p). Therefore, it can be written as: 
(8) 
: White noise. 
So the test will be: 
 (9) 
 (10) 
We still use Dickey-Fuller distribution instead of a t distribution or a normal distribution. 
When the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF test) is applied, the p-value of the test is 
0.01, which is smaller than 0.05. The null hypothesis of the test is that the series has unit 
root; alternative hypothesis is that the series is stationary. Based on the result of the test, 
we consider the data set is stationary. There is no need to use differencing, but the log 
transformation is taken to minimize the variance of the series and improve the accuracy 
of the model. 
 
3.4.5 Rainfall Differencing Operation  
An important pre-requirement of using time series method is the stability of the 
series. One method is to see the distribution of year of year differencing distribution. 
The null hypothesis of the test is that the distribution has a mean 0. This indicates that 
the year of year differencing is zero, and therefore, the series is stationary. There is no 
significant seasonal trend within the series.  
The graph below is the distribution of seasonal differences in rainfall between t 
and t-1. For example, it can be the difference between January 2013 and January 2014 
at plot 208 (Central Machakos). The distribution has a mode of 0, and there is no 
significant increasing or decreasing trend within the distribution.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10: Seasonal Differencing Distribution, Central Machakos 
 
 
 Figure 3.11: Cumulative Distribution of Seasonal Differencing, Central Machakos 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After calculating seasonal differences, and rearranging the data from the 
smallest to the biggest, a line is drawn according to this. A high percentage of data falls 
around 0. The highest difference is around 150mm. 
Seasonal differencing graphs of other areas are listed below.  
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3.12: Cumulative Distribution of Seasonal Differencing, Yathui 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.13: Seasonal Differencing Distribution, Yathui 
 
 
Figure 3.14: Cumulative Distribution of Seasonal Differencing, Yatta 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.15: Seasonal Differencing Distribution, Yatta 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.16: Cumulative Distribution of Seasonal Differencing, Masinga 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.17: Seasonal Differencing Distribution, Masinga 
 
 
 
 Figure 3.18: Cumulative Distribution of Seasonal Differencing, Matungulu 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.19: Seasonal Differencing Distribution, Matungulu 
 
 
Figure 3.20: Cumulative Distribution of Seasonal Differencing, Kalama 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.21: Seasonal Differencing Distribution, Kalama 
 
 
 
 Figure 3.22: Cumulative Distribution of Seasonal Differencing, Kathiani 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.23: Seasonal Differencing Distribution, Kathiani 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.24: Cumulative Distribution of Seasonal Differencing, Mwala 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.25: Seasonal Differencing Distribution, Mwala 
 
 
Figure 3.26: Cumulative Distribution of Seasonal Differencing, Kangundo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.27: Seasonal Differencing Distribution, Kangundo 
 
 
Figure 3.28: Cumulative Distribution of Seasonal Differencing, Ndithini 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.29: Seasonal Differencing Distribution, Ndithini 
 
 
 
Figure 3.30: Cumulative Distribution of Seasonal Differencing, Mavoko 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.31: Seasonal Differencing Distribution, Mavoko 
 
 
 
Meanwhile, the ACF and PACF of original data in Figure 3.32 shows that there 
is an obvious seasonal pattern within the rainfall. Spikes show up in 1, 12, 24 in both 
ACF and PACF graph, which confirms that rainfall pattern is seasonal with a frequency 
of 12. Within in a period, period 1, 2, 3 and 4 are significant, which composes the non-
seasonal part. In the following parts, I am going to fit my model with this pre-processed 
data set. For the moving average (MA) part, we select parameters by trying from 0, and 
1.  
 
Figure 3.32: ACF and PACF Plot of Original Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Results 
 The goal of this chapter is to decide the coefficient and parameters for SARIMA 
model in 11 plots in Kenya. AIC will be used here to select the best-fitted model in each 
area. To make sure the quality of the model, corresponding check on residuals will be 
applied to see whether current models capture all patterns within the rainfall dataset.  
 
4.1 SARIMA model and parameters selection  
4.1.1 Model selection criteria  
The goal of using the time series data is to predict the values accurately in the 
future. There are some standards that can be used to determine the best fitting model 
that is not over-fitted. Namely, we can use in-sample criteria and out-of-sample criteria.  
The In-sample criteria is calculated using the forecast errors. Mean Squared 
Error is equal to: 
(1) 
 (2) 
These are called one-step ahead forecast errors.  is the observation from the 
real series, and  comes from prediction of the previous value. This is then used to 
compute the Akaike information criterion (AIC): 
(3) 
In the function above, p is the number of parameters in the model. AIC penalizes 
models that add parameters that do not reduce the MSE very much. Generally speaking, 
a small AIC indicates a good model.  
Out-of-sample criteria estimate the predictive accuracy of the model by splitting 
the series in two parts. One is training set, which is use to generate the time series 
function, and another is test set, which is used to validate the accuracy of the prediction 
function generated from training set.  
Forecast errors can be calculated as: 
 
 (4) 
Root Mean Squared Error is: 
 (5) 
T is the total size of the series. S is the size of the training set. h is the size of test 
set. Out-of-sample criteria approach may require the model to be re-estimated many 
times by splitting a different training set and test size. The size of two sets is critical, 
and all should be large enough to support the validation process.  
Using the model created in the previous part, a set of predicted values is 
generated.  
 (6) 
It is then possible to construct a prediction interval for some degree of 
confidence, such as 95%:  
 
 (7) 
 Therefore, we can conclude that is the 95% prediction interval.  
 
4.1.2 Application  
I used AIC to help select the best-fitted model. A seasonal ARIMA model with 
a frequency of 12 was chosen for the basic form of the model. In addition, looking at 
the ACF graph above, notice that the spikes are only significant until 4 lags. The 5th 
spike is within the dashed line. It implies an AR model with order of 4 is appropriate. 
By apply auto.arima function in R, from the ‘forecast’ package, the best-fitted 
model is generated automatically, trying different specifications up to order 5 on each 
parameter. The results show a seasonal ARIMA(4,0,1)(1,0,0)[36] model with 
AIC=3318.83. Each month has 3 observable data points; therefore, the frequency here 
is 36. In addition, d equals to 0 here and it confirms that there is no trend within the 
series, and differencing is not necessary.  
 
Table 4.1: SARIMA Model Parameters and Coefficient 
 
ARIMA(4,0,1)(1,0,0)[36] AR1 AR2 AR3 AR4 MA1 SAR1 
Coefficient 1.4829   -0.3754 -0.0430   -0.1112  -0.9800  0.3159 
s.e. 0.0303   0.0511    0.0502    0.0284   0.0086   0.0334 
 
 
4.1.3 Residual check  
After deciding the parameters of the model, the next step is to apply residual 
diagnostics. A good model should have normally distributed. The figure below shows 
the distribution of residuals. 
 
Figure 4.1: Plot of Residuals 
 
After performing Ljung-Box test, with a lag equals to 36 and difference equals 
to 0, the calculated p-value is 1.423e-10. The test result indicate that the residuals follow 
a normal distribution.  
Ljung-Box test can be written as: 
: The data are independently distributed 
: The data are not independently distributed; there is serial correlation  
 
 
is the sample correlation at lag k, and h is the number of lags being tested.  
 
In addition, after applying ACF and PACF to residuals, I find that residuals are 
uncorrelated, because for ACF figure, it only has spike at 0, and after the first, there is 
no obvious correlation among residuals. Since all of the necessary conditions are 
satisfied, this seasonal ARIMA model is a good fit for further forecasting. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: ACF & PACF of Residuals 
 
If the distribution of residual is not white noise, for example, if it has a serial 
pattern within the residuals, then a linear time series model doesn’t fit this situation well. 
Non-linear time series models, such as GARCH (Generalized AutoRegression 
Conditional Heteroscedasticity)and ARCH (Autoregressive Conditionally 
Heteroscedasticity will be considered have to be considered to capture these non-
linearities.  
 
4.1.4 Forecast and lower 20% quantile of simulation  
After selecting the best-fitting model for the rainfall, I use SARIMA model with 
parameters and coefficients to generate predicted rainfall values for the future. I run 
5000 simulations, which provides 5000 possible paths of the rainfall in the following 
observation Figure. The original dataset ends on 26th June 2016, and therefore the goal 
is to predict the long rain season from 16th Oct. 2016 to 15th January 2017.  
16th Oct. 2016 is the 11th prediction after 26th June 2016, and 15th January 2017 
is the 20th prediction of the forecast. The sum of these 10 observations is the rainfall 
total for the long rain season. There should be 5,000 totals long rain predictions 
according to the times of simulation (n=5000), and we can create a distribution 
according to these 5,000 estimates. Figures below indicate the distribution for Central 
Machakos. Figure of all areas can be found in later parts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Distribution of Simulation and 20% lower quantile, Central Machakos 
 
 
The histogram above shows the distribution of rainfall totals in the long rain 
season, and the vertical line shows the lower 20% quantile of the rainfall, which is 90.7 
mm. Therefore, this number is the trigger that should be used for the weather-index 
insurance. However, in the distribution of the simulation, there are some negative 
predicted rainfalls, which is inappropriate for real life rainfall situation.  
In reality, the climate system is very complicated, and many mutual interactions 
should be considered. In future work, a relationship between the rainfall and temperature 
could be explored to construct a more accurate model. The table below shows the results 
generated by both the pert distribution method and the SARIMA method, which is the 
number of lower 20% quantile of the simulated distribution.  
 
 
4.2 Results Comparison  
 
 
Table 4.2: Cumulative Rainfall Trigger table (mm) 
Place 
Central  
Machakos 
Yathui Yatta Masinga Matungulu Kalama Kathiani Mwala Kangundo Ndithini Mavoko 
Pert 20% 120.5 141.9 145.2 186.7 143.2 137.2 118.9 132.2 109.5 105.9 122.1 
TS  20% 90.7 171.8 235.3 280.2 134.5 93.4 115.7 164 134.6 103 59 
Ratio  
(Pert/TS) 
75.27% 121.07% 162.05% 150.08% 93.92% 68.08% 97.31% 124.05% 122.92% 97.26% 48.32% 
 
Average ratio for the table above is 1.08, and standard deviation is 0.33. A simple 
t-test around 1 can be written as: 
t= =0.24 
According to the result above, we fail reject the hypothesis that ratio equals to 1 
at 0.1 significance level.  
The triggers provided by two methods are generally different. Results provided 
by SARIMA can be either bigger or smaller than results provided by the pert distribution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: All Triggers Comparison Between Two Methods 
 
 
Figure 4.4 also compares the trigger for two methods. There is not a very stable 
correlation between two methods. Results provided by SARIMA method is bigger than 
Pert Distribution in Yathui, Yatta, Masinga. Results provided by SARIMA method is 
smaller than Pert Distribution in Central Machakos, Kalama, and Mavoko. The rest parts 
have pretty close triggers.  
According the trigger comparison graph above, it becomes clear that SARIMA 
method fails to place a lower bound on rainfall, because forecast results generated by 
SARIMA method have negative value, which distort the actual distribution of the 
rainfall. Therefore, projected rainfall distribution generated by SARIMA method under 
this “negative rainfall exists” condition is more symmetric and less skewness than actual 
rainfall distribution, which has a non-negative bundle.   
The Graphs below show results generated by the pert distribution and the 
SARIMA model. Nonetheless, the marginal deviations of SARIMA method from the 
historical pert distributions are too great to be considered as the trigger of the insurance.  
 
Figure 4.5: Trigger Comparison Between Two Methods, Central Machakos 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Trigger Comparison Between Two Methods, Kalama 
 
 
  
 
Figure 4.7: Trigger Comparison Between Two Methods, Kangundo 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Trigger Comparison Between Two Methods, Kathiani 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Trigger Comparison Between Two Methods, Masinga 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Trigger Comparison Between Two Methods, Matungulu 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11: Trigger Comparison Between Two Methods, Mavoko 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Trigger Comparison Between Two Methods, Mwala 
 
 
Figure 4.13: Trigger Comparison Between Two Methods, Ndithini 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.14: Trigger Comparison Between Two Methods, Yathui 
 
 
 
Figure 4.15: Trigger Comparison Between Two Methods, Yatta 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 5: Conclusion  
 Risk-contingent credit is a flexible option for small household in Kenya to solve 
weather risks, such as drought efficiently. Weather index insurance is an application of 
RCC. The performance of underlying assets, which is rainfall determines the payoff of 
the insurance. After considering real rainfall, RCC connects the performance of 
underlying assets and payoff function of the insurance dynamically, which guarantees 
the sustainable cash flow for farmers. Therefore, even farmers suffer from drought, they 
can still get paid and continue to begin the production for the following years.  
 The purpose of this thesis was to capture patterns embedded historical rainfall, 
and therefore make prediction on future rainfall. To achieve this purpose, I use two 
methods to simulate rainfall pattern, which are Pert Distribution and SARIMA model. 
After comparing results generated two methods, I conclude that Pert Distribution 
method is more appropriate to simulate rainfall and provide trigger than SARIMA model. 
In the prediction of rainfall, the SARIMA model will generate negative values, which 
is not consistent with the reality. Those negative numbers may distort the accuracy of 
the prediction. The advantages of the pert distribution are that all numbers in the 
distribution are positive, and that the trigger won’t change from year to year.  
The methodology of time series analysis was used to forecast rainfall and find 
the corresponding confidence interval. The lower bound of the confidence interval can 
be used as a trigger for the weather-index insurance premium calculation. Both the 
insurance companies and farmers can use this as a reference when planning. While the 
pert distribution method works too, the flexibility and responsiveness of SARIMA to 
new data gives insurers a new tool to use in the determination of the trigger for weather-
index insurance 
For the SARIMA model, insurance companies will update benchmarks over time. 
Clients of the insurance may be skeptical about frequently updated triggers. They may 
think that insurance companies are cheating during the process because they are 
manipulating triggers to be favorable to the insurance companies themselves. For 
example, for this weather index-insurance, farmers may think that insurance companies 
are intentionally decreasing the value of the trigger, so issuers can reduce the probability 
of having to pay compensation. A stable trigger can therefore be valuable. 
The launch of this risk contingent credit embedded financial instruments 
provides more options for farmers to hedge risks in production, and it is a new 
opportunity for industry to earn profit in a new market. For those insurance companies, 
they can construct a portfolio which includes farmers from different areas to diversify 
risks.  
The base of potential customers for the insurance is huge, and the insurance will 
benefit all farmers who are exposed to weather risks. Unpredictable weather events will 
have a high chance to put previously self-sufficient farmers below the threshold of the 
poverty trap. Once farmers fall into poverty traps, it is extremely difficult for them to 
get out of the trap without help from the outside. The role of weather-index insurance is 
to protect these farmers from weather shocks that may push them into a poverty trap. 
Weather-index insurance is application on credit bundled with insurance, which makes 
agricultural insurances more accessible to small households in Kenya. When insured 
farmers are inevitably affected by weather shocks and their production level goes below 
the poverty trap threshold, they can still get capital and keep their farm sustainable for 
following crop seasons. 
Farmers who are slightly above the threshold will benefit the most from this risk 
contingent credit embedded product. They are fragile to catastrophic shock and index 
insurance can help them to solidify their level of production. Index-insurance is not 
panacea. For farmers who are already in low-production equilibrium, this insurance 
can’t prevent them from falling into poverty trap. 
In the future, more parameters which can capture local weather patterns will 
need to be included into this risk contingent credit pricing model, and repayment 
function will also be adjusted accordingly to satisfy different cases. For example, 
besides rainfall, temperature is another important factor for the growth of crops. If the 
premium function can incorporate more independent variables, the accuracy of the 
model will be improved. 
With accurate rainfall pattern forecasts, insurance companies can design fairly-
priced risk contingent credit embedded products that farmers find worth buying. Ideally, 
a practical insurance product should capture the pattern of insured goods accurately. It 
should also be easily observable and objective.  
Risk contingent credit embedded financial instrument is a promising instrument 
for farmers, and it has natural advantages over traditional claimed insurance. The 
objectivity of index-insurance avoids moral hazard completely. Since it provides a 
universal benchmark, which also eliminate the need for the insurance company to 
evaluate loss and indemnity case by case.  Every characteristic of index-insurance 
mentioned above will make this financial instrument more affordable and accessible to 
farmers, especially those in rural areas. 
How to find right indicators to represent the actual suffering of farmers becomes 
a very important question. There are cases in which insurance cannot compensate the 
loss borne by farmers accurately. There might be other important factors that also 
influence production; however, the mechanism of the credit and insurance doesn’t 
include those equally important factors, which will damage the efficiency of the 
insurance. 
Besides influential indicators, correlations among indicators are very important 
and difficult to deal with. Even if researchers learn about all of the meaningful factors, 
problematic correlations among indicators will also hurt the value of insurance. For 
example, correlation between high temperature and possibility of hitting drought should 
be different from the correlation between moderate temperature and possibility of 
hitting drought. Therefore, with the introduction of more weather indicators, such as 
temperature, the correlation among those indicators can’t be captured sufficiently by a 
constant, and correlation should be changeable according to different combination of 
weather indicators.  
In future, more research should focus on the possible correlation simulation, 
either within the same rainfall season or between the long rain and the short rain seasons. 
The copula method will be a powerful tool to solve this issue. Finding all of the relevant 
indicators and their correlations to one another is an essential role for future research.  
In addition, correlations among different parameters, such as precipitation, and 
temperature will be taken into consideration. Copulas can be a way to simulate 
changeable correlation between parameters. Copulas are used to describe the 
dependence between random variables. For example, the correlation between 
temperature and rainfall is not constant- correlation between low rainfall and high 
temperature is much stronger than correlation between medium rainfall and medium 
temperature. Traditional constant correlation between random variables doesn’t capture 
the complexity of climate relationships. 
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 Appendix:  
 
```{r} 
## % dist graph 
data=merged_master 
uncom=data %>% 
mutate(perc=food_expense/(food_expense+common_expense+uncommon_expense)) 
 
a=as.data.frame(uncom$perc) 
p1=ggplot(data=a,aes(x=uncom$perc))+geom_histogram() 
   
p1+theme(panel.background = element_blank())+labs(title="Food Expense Percentage 
Among Total Budget",x="percentage",y="count") 
``` 
 
```{r} 
##crop production 
maize=as.data.frame(data$maize_per_acre) 
maizenona=maize[!is.na(maize)] 
bean=as.data.frame(data$bean_per_acre1) 
beannona=bean[!is.na(bean)] 
pea=as.data.frame(data$cowpea_per_acre1) 
peanona=pea[!is.na(pea)] 
 
p2=ggplot(data=crop)+geom_histogram(aes(x=crop$maize_per_acre),fill="red",alpha
=0.8)+ 
  geom_histogram(aes(x=crop$bean_per_acre1),fill="green",alpha=0.5)+ 
  geom_histogram(aes(x=crop$cowpea_per_acre1),fill="blue",alpha=0.8)+ 
  scale_x_continuous(limits=c(0,1000))+theme(panel.background = element_blank())+ 
  labs(title="Different Crop Production Count",x="Production",y="Count") 
 
 
   
 
Chapter 4 code: 
model <- Arima((data$rain) , order= c(4, 0 ,1), seasonal= list(order = c(1, 0, 0), period = 36), include.mean 
= FALSE) 
sims <- 1000 
sims_result <- NULL 
 
for(i in 1:sims) { 
      
     foo <- simulate(model, nsim = 20) 
     #index 11 is 16-oct-16, index 20 is 16-jan-17 
     sims_result <- rbind(sims_result, (foo[11:20])) 
      
 } 
 sums <- apply(sims_result, 1, sum) 
(sort(sums))[200] 
 
hist(sums,xlab="long rain", ylab="count",main="Long Rain Distribution 2017") 
quantile(sums,0.2) 
abline(v=quantile(sums,0.2),col="red") 
 
Other  SARIMA parameters and resulting coefficients: 
Plot 213: (Yathui) 
Series: (n213$`213`)  
ARIMA(4,0,0)(1,0,0)[36] with zero mean  
 
Coefficients: 
         ar1     ar2     ar3     ar4    sar1 
      0.4136  0.1523  0.1139  0.0104  0.2666 
s.e.  0.0309  0.0302  0.0301  0.0284  0.0317 
 
Plot 214: 
Series: (n214$`214`)  
ARIMA(4,0,1)(1,0,0)[36] with zero mean  
 
Coefficients: 
          ar1     ar2     ar3     ar4     ma1    sar1 
      -0.1178  0.4034  0.1021  0.1077  0.6637  0.8590 
s.e.   0.7972  0.4532  0.1459  0.1438  0.7918  0.0609 
 
Plot 225: (Yatta) 
Series: (n225$rain)  
ARIMA(4,0,1)(1,0,0)[36] with zero mean  
 
Coefficients: 
         ar1     ar2     ar3     ar4     ma1    sar1 
      0.0212  0.4770  0.0085  0.0424  0.5901  0.8856 
s.e.  0.0296  0.2224  0.1470  0.1469  0.1037  0.0594 
 
Plot 230: (Masinga) 
Series: (n230$rain)  
ARIMA(4,0,1)(1,0,0)[36] with zero mean  
 
Coefficients: 
         ar1     ar2    ar3     ar4     ma1    sar1 
      0.1788  0.3894  0.077  0.0111  0.1744  0.6665 
s.e.     NaN  0.0019    NaN  0.0023  0.0018  0.0027 
 
Plot 248: (Kalama) 
Series: (n248$rain)  
ARIMA(4,0,1)(1,0,0)[36] with zero mean  
 
Coefficients: 
          ar1     ar2     ar3     ar4     ma1    sar1 
      -0.2882  0.4644  0.2197  0.1431  0.7135  0.6322 
s.e.   0.5639  0.2785  0.1761  0.1415  0.5555  0.1561 
Plot 251: (Kathiani) 
Series: (n251$rain)  
ARIMA(4,0,1)(1,0,0)[36] with zero mean  
 
Coefficients: 
          ar1     ar2     ar3     ar4     ma1    sar1 
      -0.2841  0.5217  0.1974  0.0994  0.6796  0.7089 
s.e.   0.4423  0.2240  0.1902  0.1422  0.4275  0.1324 
 
Plot 252: (Mwala) 
Series: (n252$rain)  
ARIMA(4,0,1)(1,0,0)[36] with zero mean  
 
Coefficients: 
         ar1     ar2     ar3     ar4     ma1    sar1 
      -0.346  0.5114  0.1979  0.1172  0.7638  0.7931 
s.e.   0.352  0.1973  0.1624  0.1393  0.3256  0.0931 
 
Plot 263: (Kangundo) 
Series: (n263$rain)  
ARIMA(4,0,1)(1,0,0)[36] with zero mean  
 
Coefficients: 
          ar1     ar2     ar3     ar4     ma1    sar1 
      -0.2427  0.5441  0.1827  0.0427  0.6205  0.7728 
s.e.   0.0474     NaN  0.1023  0.0094     NaN     NaN 
 
Plot 264: (Ndithini) 
Series: (n264$rain)  
ARIMA(4,0,1)(1,0,0)[36] with zero mean  
 
Coefficients: 
          ar1     ar2     ar3      ar4    ma1    sar1 
      -0.5126  0.7300  0.3112  -0.0812  1.000  0.7409 
s.e.   0.1357  0.1643  0.1395   0.1483  0.026  0.1071 
 
Plot 265: (Mavoko)  
Series: (n265$rain)  
ARIMA(4,0,1)(1,0,0)[36] with zero mean  
 
Coefficients: 
         ar1     ar2     ar3     ar4     ma1    sar1 
      0.0463  0.3227  0.1777  0.1123  0.2800  0.5442 
s.e.  0.8478  0.3168  0.2503  0.1712  0.8427  0.19
